The Operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria and Discriminatory Monopoly by Ejumudo, Tobi Folasade & Ejumudo, Kelly Bryan Ovie
Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy                                                                                                                                      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3232 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0573 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.6, 2014 
 
60 
The Operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria and 
Discriminatory Monopoly 
Tobi Folasade Ejumudo 
Research and Development Department, Rohi Eclectic Consult 
 
Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo 
Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Nigeria 
Abstract 
Efficient and effective electricity generation, transmission and distribution are critical to national development in 
both developed and developing societies. This study examines the constraining role of the prevailing 
discriminatory monopolistic environment in the actualization of adequate and sustained power supply in Nigeria. 
The data utilized in this study were derived from both primary and secondary sources. While the primary data 
were obtained from focused group discussions, the secondary data were sourced from relevant text books, 
journals and available statistics on electricity generation and supply in Nigeria. The findings of the study reveals 
that the discriminatory monopolistic environment typified by near absence of competition and poor service 
culture have severely constrained the much-desired adequate electricity generation capacity and effective service 
delivery in Nigeria. Finally, the study recommends among others that the Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
should operate in a competitive industrial environment where there exists a service culture. 
Key words: Operations, discriminatory monopoly, Power Holding Company, Nigeria. 
 
1. Introduction 
Electricity plays a very important role in the socio-economic and technological development of every nation. 
Globally, electricity operations involve three critical activities namely: generation, transmission and distribution. 
These activities are not only cyclically connected; they are at the heart of the operations of the electricity 
industry in the energy sector. While electricity generation constitute the basis of the electricity supply chain 
because it provides the major plank for capacity building in the electricity sub-energy sector, the available 
electricity capacity generated requires an adequate transmission and a functional distribution system with the 
required wheeling capacity to meet national needs in terms of coverage and efficiency. At the end of the 
electricity supply chain is the distribution network that includes the voltage profile and the billing system that 
inter-faces with the public and ensures adequate network coverage and provision of quality power supply in 
addition to efficient marketing and customer service delivery. 
 
Central to the electricity generation, transmission and distribution activities in both developed and developing 
societies is the environment of competition and service culture that is almost absent in an industry that is 
monopolistic and dominated by a single operator. Notably, competitive environments encourage efficient and 
effective allocation of resources so as to achieve a favourably competitive output and gain a cutting edge 
advantage. Such environments lead to the development of a service culture and the resultant delivery of quality 
services. This is particularly because competition brings about the desire to outwit other players in performance 
and enjoy the cutting edge advantage in any industry or environment. 
 
Conversely, a monopoly misallocates resources by contriving shortages-producing less than the competitive 
output in order to create monopoly profits. There are also the associated costs of deadweight loss and monopoly 
rent seeking. The deadweight loss represents lost consumer surplus that was not converted into monopoly profits. 
This lost consumer surplus is received by no one. Consumers have lost it because the monopoly has restricted 
output, but it has not been received by anyone in the economy. This lost consumer surplus is referred to as the 
deadweight loss of monopoly. It is a deadweight loss because nothing is received in exchange for the loss; it is 
equivalent to throwing a valuable resource away. On the other hand, the rent seeking cost is hard to identify, but 
it seems likely that a great deal of managerial and entrepreneurial talent is spent seeking to establish monopoly 
power. This cost of monopoly has become known as monopoly rent seeking and it is a cost of monopoly because 
these resources are no longer available to produce goods and services. Still another cost of monopoly is 
inefficiency. Leibenstein (2012), for example, argues that while competitive firms are forced to be efficient by 
the market, this does not hold true for monopolies. This is largely because since monopoly is not punished by the 
market for slack management and the monopolist will tend to have more managerial “looseness” than a 
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competitor. X-inefficiency is therefore considered as and used to describe the costs associated with this lean and 
trim management and this cost has been estimated to be as high as 2 percent of GPN. 
 
In Nigeria, electricity generation, transmission and distribution activities have over the years been dominated by 
the government-owned electricity company. Essentially, from 1951 when by an Act of Parliament in 1951, the 
Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN) was established through the setting up of the Niger Dams Authority 
(NDA) in 1962 and the subsequent merger of the two (2) in 1972 to form the National Electric Power Authority 
(NIEPA) as well as the unbundling and the power reform process that culminated in the renaming of NEPA as 
Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) in 2005, the electricity industry had been arguably monopolistic. In 
fact, despite the power sector reform of 2005 that was expectedly supposed to ensure private sector participation 
in electricity generation, transmission and distribution in Nigeria, the operations of the state-owned Power 
Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) have been bedevilled by sundry problems including inadequate generation 
capacity, inadequate and delayed maintenance of facilities, insufficient funding of power stations, obsolete 
equipment, tools, safety facilities and operational vehicles, inadequate and obsolete communication equipment, 
lack of exploration to tap all the existing sources of energy from the available resources; poor staff commitment 
and low morale and poor transmission and distribution network system. 
 
At the heart of the operational problems and lack-lustre performance of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria, 
is the discriminatory monopolistic environment in which the state-owned company operates and the largely non-
existent service culture that is already in-grained. This study discusses the operations of the Power Holding 
Company of Nigeria in the context of discriminatory monopoly. 
 
2. Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of the study are to: 
1.  Highlight the indices of inefficient and ineffective operations in the Power Holding Company of 
Nigeria. 
2  Assess the link between a non-competitive discriminatory monopolistic environment and inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness in the operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria. 
3  Examine the impact of poor service culture on the operations of the Power Holding Company of 
Nigeria. 
4.  Make useful recommendations that will bring about efficiency and effectiveness in the operations of the 
electricity industry through a competitive environment where there exists a service culture. 
 
3. Research Questions 
1  Is there is a significant relationship between a non-competitive discriminatory monopolistic 
environment and the inefficient and ineffective operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria? 
2  Is there is a significant relationship between poor service culture and the inefficient and ineffective 
operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria? 
 
4. Justification for the Study 
Several studies have been carried out to investigate the operations and performance of public sector 
organizations including the Power Holding Company of Nigeria. For instance, Sambo et al in 2006 examined 
electricity generation and challenges in Nigeria with a focus on the funding and capacity gap which they contend 
are constraining factors to the capital-intensive operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria. In a 
similar vein, Sule (2009) investigated the major factors affecting electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution in Nigeria and the focus was on the non-diversification of energy sources and poor maintenance 
culture. There is however paucity of research efforts in the area of monopolistic non-competitive operational 
environment and largely non-existing service culture. This relatively unstudied area and an identifiable gap is 
evidently a justification for this study. 
 
5. Scope of the Study 
Although electricity generation, transmission and distribution operations issues are of concern to both developed 
and developing societies because they are critical to the development process and its sustainability, this study is 
confined to the Power Holding Company of Nigeria. The scope of the study is therefore the Power Holding 
Company in Nigeria. 
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6. Research Methods 
This study adopted a qualitative and quantitative case study method. Case studies involve the investigation of a 
specific phenomenon, event, group or organization with an eye to gaining a deeper understanding of it. They are 
especially fruitful for stimulating insights into further studies as Selltiz (2006) succinctly asserted. Case studies 
seek to describe the relationship between variables and identify the factors at play. They can fruitfully rely on 
observation, intensive interviewing and content analysis of documents as ways of generating and capturing the 
data germane to the study. The qualitative aspect of the case study method, according to Robert Yin (2003), has 
three aspects viz: investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, the existence of 
boundaries between the phenomenon and the real life context and the use of multiple sources of evidence. The 
qualitative case study method also lends itself to exploratory, descriptive and explanatory methods. Yin 
emphasized that exploratory research attempts to find out about a situation, while the descriptive and explanatory 
research types respectively seek to know “what happened” and how and “why it happened.” This study which 
examined the operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) in the context of discriminatory 
monopoly in Nigeria attempted a description and an explanation of the impact of discriminatory monopoly on 
the operations of PHCN in Nigeria through in-depth analysis of valuable secondary data and focus group 
discussions. 
 
7. Literature Review 
Electrical power generation, transmission and distribution are the three stages of delivering electricity to 
consumers in residential, industrial, commercial, and administrative areas. The supply of adequate and stable 
electricity to consumers is critical to the socio-economic development in both developed and developing 
societies. Inadequate and unstable supply of electricity to consumers, on the other hand, constrains socio-
economic development in such societies 
 
7.1 Electricity Generation in Nigeria 
The first electricity generating plant in Nigeria was installed in Lagos in 1896. The Plants were installed at 
isolated units owned and operated by either Native Authorities as in Ibadan and Kano, or by the public works 
departments as in Warri and Port-Harcourt. The isolated units were merged together when the Colonial 
Government in Nigeria passed the ordinance No. 15 of 1950 which set up the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria 
(Uwaifo, 1994). The Corporation and the Niger Dams Authority set up by an Act of Parliament in 1962 to 
exploit the water resources of the River Niger were unified into the National Electric Power Authority in 1973 
through the Federal Military Government Decree No. 24 of June 27, 1972 (Uwaifo, 1994). The first electricity 
generating plant to be commissioned in Nigeria was Ijora ‘B’ Power station (Lagos) in 1956 by the head of the 
British Common Wealth and Queen Elizabeth. A grid power transmission system that evolved connecting large 
power stations in Kainji, Jebba, Shiroro, Afam, Delta (Ughelli), Sapele (Ogorode) and Egbin (Lagos) came into 
being in the first half of the 1960s. That grid system served every state capital in Nigeria. By 1992, the total 
installed generation plant capacity was about 5,900 Mw. The total electricity available was 3,000 Mw and the 
coincident maximum demand had reached 2,400Mw (Adeola, 2007). 
 
In 2009, the electricity generating station installed capacity in Nigeria was 5000Mw, but only 2900Mw was 
generated as at November, 2009 (Babalola, 2009). Electricity can be generated at Hydro, Thermal, Wind, and 
Solar generating stations. Electricity is generated at thermal generating stations where fossil fuels such as crude 
oil, natural gas and coal are burnt to produce high pressure (typically 2400 to 3500/lb/in and high temperature 
(1000°F) steam, which is used to drive turbines at 3600 rev/mm which in turn drive electrical generators to 
produce electricity (Donald et al, 2010). The concentrated solar power generating stations use mirrors or lenses 
to concentrate sunlight into a relatively small area and then use the resulting heat to raise steam to drive steam 
turbines and generators to produce Alternative Current (AC) power. There are, in fact, two methods of 
generating electricity namely; conventional method and non-conventional method. The conventional method 
makes use of prime movers such as petrol engine, diesel engine, steam turbine, while the non-conventional 
method does not use prime movers. The availability of natural fuels such as coal, crude oil and natural gas of 180 
trillion cubic feet (Amotsuka, 2008) in Nigeria led to the utilization of hydro plants and steam gas turbines for 
electricity generation at Afam, Delta, Egbin, Sapele, Kainji, Shiroro, Jebba and the Monbila electricity 
generating stations. 
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7.2 Capacity of Electricity Generation Stations in Nigeria 
In the face of the relevance of the power sector in the overall development and sustenance of the economy in 
Nigeria, the daunting challenge of getting it right in the electricity sector is an age-long one. Successive regimes 
have continued to make the power sector an area of concern to tackle. This is not unconnected with the fact that 
a viable power sector will inevitably have a trickledown effect on every sector of the economy. Statistics 
currently show that power generation stands at 3 000-4000mw, but supply has remained generally very erratic 
and unsatisfactory following faults and deficiencies caused by drop in power generation. Some studies had 
attributed the poor and grossly inefficient and ineffective electricity generation in Nigeria which started at ljora 
in Lagos in 1896 to governmental control, neglect and inadequate investment that resulted in the dilapidated 
power system with high technical and non- technical losses, poor maintenance of power generation facilities and 
inadequate metering capacity and planning for capacity expansion of infrastructure (Egwu, 2013). 
 
Other studies that examined the electricity generation reality in Nigeria linked the situation to the low utilization 
of other available electricity generation sources, particularly gas and coal (Morison, 2011; Afe, 2012). The major 
finding is essentially true considering the poor and epileptic power situation in Nigeria despite the fact the gas 
sector holds significant potential, with Nigeria having the 7th largest gas reserves in the world. In fact, following 
several years of low domestic gas utilization, the sector is now confronted with a huge potential for 
unprecedented growth from about 5bcf/d currently to over 2Obcf/d by 2011/15. At present, there is no single 
coal-fired-power plant operating in Nigeria despite the abundance of high quality of coal deposits, and yet its 
exploitation is at its lowest ebb. As a matter-of-fact, Nigeria uses three types of electricity generation stations 
namely hydro-generating stations, steam turbine generating stations and gas turbine generating stations and they 
are interconnected in radial form with a single National Control Centre (NCC) at Oshogbo. This has lead to the 
low reliability index of the National grid (Yusuf et al, 2007). 
 
Electricity generation in Nigeria was monopolistic until 2005 when the EPSR Act repealed the National Electric 
Power Authority (NEPA) Act and the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was formed from NEPA to 
serve as a transitory holding company prior to the unbundling of the sector. The Act provided for the creation of 
successor companies (SCs) from PHCN and 18 SCs comprising eleven distribution companies, six generation 
companies and one transmission company has since been created. The Act supposedly came in to being in 
response to the dire shortage of electric power and the need for urgent reform of the sector. The EPSR Act 
provides for two stages of market development viz: pre-privatisation stage and post privatisation stage. The pre- 
transition stage involved restructuring, review of regulatory framework and creation of a sector regulator. The 
role of NERC as the sector regulator is to provide a formal independent regulatory framework for the electricity 
industry, ensure sustainable growth, development and stability of the sector, boost investor confidence, protect 
the interests of consumers, promote competition within the industry, set and enforce quality standards, enforce 
consumer service obligations, and provide all necessary regulatory functions for the electricity industry (Yusuf et 
al, 2013). NERC also licenses and regulates persons engaged in the electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution operations in Nigeria. 
 
In spite of the human, financial and time resources invested in the power sector reform in Nigeria, electricity 
generation has remained problematic. For instance, while the Nigerian government awarded contracts for the 
generation, transmission and distribution of 6000Mw with the completion date of December 2010, the installed 
capacity of electricity generating stations in Nigeria was 5 000Mw, with only 2,900 Mw generated as at 
November, 2009 due to sundry inhibiting factors. Again, while it is true that the Federal Government of Nigeria 
initiated the construction of 3 coal power plants at Enugu, Gombe and Kogi, Nigeria’s goal to revitalize the coal 
mining industry and expand power generation by attracting companies to develop these large coal resources and 
construct coal-fired generating plants that will connect the country’s national grid is yet to be translated from 
mere action plan into concrete reality. After all, only about 40% of the country’s population (of about 160 
million) has access to electricity, with a total consumer figure of about 4.5 million (Derek, 2013). Arguably, it 
can be asserted that lack of vision, failure of strategic planning, perverse political incentive and weak 
commitment to development goals and corruption are factors in the infrastructural, operational and systemic 
deficit as well as the service malady that have characterized the appalling performance of the power sector in 
Nigeria. 
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Table 1 shown below gives the locations and the ratings of electricity generating stations in Nigeria.  
Electricity Generating Capacity of Electricity Generating Stations in Nigeria 
 
Station Type No. of Units Installed Capacity 
   KV out MW out 
Kainji Hydro 8 16.0 760 
Afam I-III Gas Turbine 12 10.5 260 
Afam IV Gas Turbine 6 11.5 450 
Afam V Gas Turbine 5 11.5 760 
Egbin Steam Turbine 6 16.0 1320 
Egbin Gas Turbine 9 11.5 270 
Jebba Hydro 6 16.0 570 
Sapele Steam Turbine 6 16.0 720 
Sapele Gas Turbine 4 10.5 300 
Shiroro Hydro 4 16.0 400 
Delta II Gas Turbine 6 11.5 120 
Delta III Gas Turbine 6 11.5 120 
Delta IV Gas Turbine 6 11.5 600 
 
Source: (Nigeria Society of Engineers Technical Transactions, 2013, Vol. 42, No. 1, p. 27). 
7.3 Electricity Transmission 
Power transmission is the process in which large block of electricity is carried from the generating stations to 
distribution stations using 330KV EHV transmission lines; 132KV transmission lines and 33KV sub- 
transmission lines either at 50 KHz or 60 KHz transmission frequency. In Nigeria, the transmission system does 
not cover every part of the country. In fact, it currently has the capacity to transmit a maximum of about 3,200 
MW and it is technically weak and very sensitive to major disturbances (Adegoke, 2013). Some of the major 
problems identified for the poor electricity transmission system in Nigeria include inadequate funding by the 
Federal government whose resource allocation cannot adequately meet all the requirements; the awfully low 
electricity wheeling capacity that is presently 5,000 MW which is below the required national needs; outdated 
sections of the national grid with inadequate redundancies as opposed to the required mesh arrangement; 
irregular expansion, updating, modernization and maintenance of the network; regular vandalization of lines, 
largely due to the low level of surveillance and security on electrical infrastructures and equipment; poor 
technologies with inadequate delivery and voltage systems; high prevalence of inadequate working tools and 
vehicles for operating and maintaining the network and poor technical staff with low capacity building and 
training programmes (Adegoke, 2013). 
 
7.4 Electricity Distribution 
After the transmission process, the distribution process follows immediately. At the distribution stations, the line 
voltage is stepped down from 11KV to 0.4 15KV using three phase secondary distribution transformer or 
0.22KV using single phase primary distribution transformer. In most locations in Nigeria, the distribution 
network and the voltage profile are poor and grossly ineffective. The billing system is also inaccurate. As the 
department, which inter-faces with the public, the need to ensure adequate network coverage and provision of 
quality power supply in addition to efficient marketing and customer service delivery cannot be over-
emphasized. Some of the major problems identified are weak and inadequate network coverage; overloaded 
transformers and bad feeder pillar; substandard distribution lines; poor billing system; unwholesome practices by 
staff and poor customer relations; inadequate logistic facilities such as tools and working vehicles; poor and 
obsolete communication equipment; low staff morale and lack of regular training and insufficient funds for 
maintenance activities (Olutayo, 2013). 
 
The electricity distribution situation in Nigeria is so poor and epileptic such that Uwaifo (1994) stressed that in 
Nigeria, the power distribution efficiency plummeted to 74 percent, while since 1969 the USA power 
distribution efficiency has been 95 percent. In a similar vein, Uwaifo (1994) stated that since 1991, the average 
number of consumers for each distribution transformer increased to 220 in Nigeria. This glaring reality 
compared with the United States of America where the number of consumers per each distribution transformer is 
10 is a source great concern, apart from the hydra-headed socio economic implications. 
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7.5 Discriminatory Monopoly 
Price discrimination prevails in many of the markets where the sellers are monopolist or oliogopolists (Watson, 
2010). It is the practice of selling identical products at different prices or similar products at price ratios that 
charge from the corresponding ratios of marginal costs. To engage in price discrimination, a firm needs to be 
able to set price, sort buyers (or induce buyers to sort themselves) and thwart resale. Analysis of price 
discrimination was first initiated in the mid l9th century by Julius Dupotit (1804-06) and other French Engineers 
concerned with bridges, roads and similar public works (Edison, 2013). In economic literature, price 
discrimination is a neutral term; no odium attached to it. Neither does the expression discriminatory monopolist 
convey any suggestion of approval. In general, price discrimination means that a firm charges two or more prices 
for the same thing at the same time. It can also mean that the differences in the prices of a firm’s product are 
greater than the differences in their cost of production. The theory of price discrimination throws almost the 
whole emphasis on the demand side. Costs of course, must be aligned with demand, but otherwise costs play 
subordinate role. In contract, business practice usually put the stress on differences in cost, because it is often 
hard to estimate, for demand tends to be ignored or given scant attention. Price discrimination is an extension of 
monopoly pricing, in the broad rather than in the narrow meaning of monopoly. Any seller with a sloping 
demand curve is a monopolist in the broad and loose sense. A firm that is a price maker can look to the 
possibilities of price discrimination, this is true of a monopolist who prices independently, or an oligopolistic, or 
a monopolistic competitor. 
 
The prerequisites of price discrimination are separate markets and differences of elasticity of demand between 
the markets. An old example is the monopoly that sells at a high price in the domestic market and at a low price 
in the foreign market. The two markets are kept separate by a tariff wall; domestic buyers cannot place orders 
abroad at the lower price in the foreign market because demand is more elastic. Owing to the competition from 
other similar products, such competition is lacking in the domestic market. How far can a monopolist go in 
charging different prices for the same product? What is the limit of the increase in net profit from price 
discrimination? The limit is defined in the concept of discrimination of the first degree. The expression was 
employed by A.C.Pigou, the English economist, who created the idea of degree of discrimination (Holman, 
2007). 
 
In discrimination of the first degree, the monopolist knows the maximum amount of money each consumer will 
pay for any quantity. The monopolist then set prices accordingly and takes from each consumer the entire 
amount of the consumers’ surplus. Robinson (1999) calls the same thing perfect discrimination, which is perfect, 
however, only from the point of view of the monopolist. It is a hypothetical case in which a seller charges the 
maximum the buyer is willing to pay for each unit. In the MR, is the cost unit sold (- the lowest price charged on 
any unit). Equating MR and MC means in this case, providing where the MC Arrow crosses the demand curve 
(Edison, 2013). A monopolist who achieves fist-degree price discrimination would capture all the gains from 
trade. The simplest kind of discrimination of the first degree is one where knowing exactly how willingly they 
are, the monopolist charges each one a price so high that the consumer almost, but not quite, refuses to pay the 
prices. If all the consumers have’ different tastes, the monopolist has a different price for each one. The lowest 
price is determined by costs. When consumers buy more than one unit of the monopolist’s product, they are 
willing to buy more units at lower prices. The monopolist must then adjust the units of sale. Suppose that a 
consumer who could choose how many units he or she wanted to buy would buy 10 units if the price were N1 
each. 
 
In discrimination of the second degree, the monopolist captures parts of the consumer’s surpluses, but not all of 
them. A firm practices second-degree or indirect price discrimination when its unit price schedule under which 
the unit price paid by a buyer depends on the quantity or quality a buyer with price not proportional to the 
marginal cost (Amacher and Ulbrich, 2011). In selecting a quality or quantity, a buyer simultaneously selects a 
price. Thus second-degree price discrimination is a quantity discount and two part tariffs (an entry/exit and usage 
charge). The schedules of rates typically charged by public utilities can be regarded as a form of second degree 
discrimination. Second degree discrimination is necessarily practiced in markets where there are many buyers, 
sometimes hundreds of thousands of them. One rate or price schedule must apply to all buyers. Because taste and 
incomes differ, the monopolist can seize only a small part of the consumers surpluses of those buyers whose 
desires for the service are stronger and whose income are higher. Second-degree discrimination is furthermore 
limited to services sold in blocks of small units-cubic feet of gas, kilowatt hours of electricity, minutes of 
telephoning-that can be easily metered, recorded, and billed. 
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Third-degree price discrimination means that the monopolist divides customers into two or more classes or 
groups, charging a different price to each class of customer (Sharp, 2011). Each class is a separate market, e.g., 
the box seats, the reserved grandstand seats, the unreserved grandstand seats and the bleachers. This occurs when 
seller discriminate two or more groups of buyers and offers them identical goods at different prices or similar 
goods at prices not proportional to marginal cost. The seller actively matches buyers with price offer rather than 
relying on buyer self-selection. The seller attempts to group together buyer with similar price estimates, offering 
low price to buyers with elasticity that is high in absolute value, and high price to buyers with elasticity that are 
low in absolute value, for instance a profile or revenue-maximizing bridge opens for faced with the data in the 
table, worked as we have seen set a lower toll for workers that wealthy tourists. 
 
Public utility companies also practice price discrimination of the third degree, by grouping their customers into 
separate market such as residential, commercial and industrial (Amacher and Ulbrich, 2011). Each market is 
further subdivided into submarkets, such as different times of the day and different uses of the service. Prices 
differ from one submarket to another, and besides, second-degree discrimination is practiced within each 
submarket. The regulatory authorities must approve, of course, the complex patterns of price discrimination 
chosen by public utility companies. The simplest analytical means illustration of third-degree price 
discrimination is that of the monopolist who sells something, already produced, in two separate markets. The 
problem resembles that of the monopolistic selling in the immediate market, because there is some given amount 
to sell, the monopolist adjusts the amounts in each so that marginal revenue are equal. Here is another 
manifestation of the equi-marginal principle. The last units sold in each of the two markets make the same 
addition to total revenue. The theory of price discrimination just reviewed can be extended to the problem of 
determining the prices for the multiple products of a firm. 
 
7.6 Discriminatory Monopoly and the Operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
Despite the critical role of the power sector in the overall development and sustenance of Nigeria’s economy, 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution that constitute the core of the operations of the Power 
Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) have been problematic and a great challenge to the government and 
people of Nigeria. The paradox of the age-long problem is inability of the country to adequately generate and 
efficiently transmit and distribute electricity that is required to satisfy the developmental needs of the people and 
government of Nigeria. Arguably, successive regimes have seemingly continued to make the power sector an 
area of concern and to invest varying sums of money to tackle the identified problems. For instance, the 
Obasanjo civilian administration invested about $6b in the electricity sector (Edison, 2013).  All the same, the 
power sector performance in Nigeria leaves much to be desired, especially as it has continually constrained the 
development of the country at all levels. Statistics show that power generation now stands at 3000-4000mw but 
supply remained generally very erratic and unsatisfactory following faults and deficiencies caused by drop in 
power generation (2013). 
 
Some studies had attributed the poor and grossly inefficient and ineffective electricity generation in Nigeria 
which started at ljora in Lagos in 1896 to governmental control, neglect and inadequate investment that resulted 
in the dilapidated power system with high technical and non- technical losses, poor maintenance of power 
generation facilities and inadequate metering capacity and planning for capacity expansion of infrastructure 
(Egwu, 2013). Other studies that examined the generation reality in Nigeria linked the situation to the low 
utilization of other available electricity generation sources, particularly gas and coal (Morrison, 2011; Afe, 
2012). The major finding is essentially true considering the poor and epileptic power situation in Nigeria despite 
the fact the gas sector holds significant potential, with Nigeria having the 7th largest gas reserves in the world. 
Notably, the contention of this study is that the persistently poor and epileptic electricity generation, transmission 
and distribution problem in Nigeria is a product of the discriminatory monopolistic environment and poor service 
culture in which the Power Holding Company of Nigeria. 
 
Electricity generation in Nigeria was monopolistic until 2005 when the EPSR Act repealed the National Electric 
Power Authority (NEPA) Act and the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was formed from NEPA to 
serve as a transitory holding company prior to the unbundling of the sector. The Act provided for the creation of 
successor companies (SCs) from PHCN and 18 SCs comprising eleven distribution companies, six generation 
companies and one transmission company has since been created. The Act supposedly came in to being in 
response to the dire shortage of electric power and the need for urgent reform of the sector. The role of NERC as 
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the sector regulator is to provide a formal independent regulatory framework for the electricity industry, ensure 
sustainable growth, development and stability of the sector, boost investor confidence, protect the interests of 
consumers, promote competition within the industry, set and enforce quality standards, enforce consumer service 
obligations and provide all necessary regulatory functions for the electricity industry (Yusuf et al, 2013). In spite 
of the human, financial and time resources invested in the power sector reform in Nigeria, electricity generation 
has remained problematic. Arguably, it can be asserted that lack of vision, failure of strategic planning, perverse 
political incentive and weak commitment to development goals and corruption are key players in the 
infrastructural, operational and systemic deficit as well as the service malady that have characterized the 
appalling performance of the power sector in Nigeria. 
 
The facts generated during the focus group discussions involving three groups of discussants: academics, 
electricity consumers and workers of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) in Nigeria (May-June, 
2013) revealed that the discriminatory monopolistic environment in which the company operates, apart from the 
reality that it did not provide the challenge that is needed to perform optimally for purpose of achieving 
maximum efficiency and effectiveness the same environment, it also stifled the creation and growth of a service 
culture that is needed to guide operators in ensuring a customer focus orientation in the discharge of their 
activities. In fact, a convergence of opinion showed that a competitive environment enhanced with an existing 
service culture will bring about competition for the cutting- edge among operators in the electricity industry. 
There is therefore an agreement between the contention in this study and the congruence of ideas generated 
during the focus group discussions. The two research questions in this study are, as a consequence, relevant. This 
is because the findings of the study revealed that there exists a significant relationship between the 
discriminatory monopolistic environment and the lack of service culture with the level of inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness that has persistently characterized the operations of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria. 
 
8. Conclusive Remarks and Recommendations 
Efficient and effective electricity generation, transmission and distribution are central to and at the heart of the 
development in all societies. This assertion is premised on the reasoning that socio-economic growth and 
development cannot be successfully actualized without the critical input from the electricity (power) sector. 
Essentially, individuals groups and governmental as well as business organizations and institutions require 
adequate and stable electricity supply for their day to day operations. However, the epileptic and unstable nature 
of the electricity generation, transition and distribution evident in the operations of the Power Holding Company 
of Nigeria has largely constituted an enduring and in-grained factor that has constrained and is still constraining 
the developmental activities and aspirations of the Nigerian entity. There is therefore the exigency for a genuine 
commitment by the Nigerian government to its electricity reform efforts and action plans, a favourable 
predisposition by the operators in the electricity industry in Nigeria, particularly the management and staff of the 
Power Holding Company of Nigeria as well as a stimulating competitive and environment with an entrenched 
service and maintenance culture. 
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